What makes China’s “magic weapon” of influence?

The People’s Republic of China has a “magic weapon,” according to its founding leader Mao Zedong and its current president Xi Jinping.

It’s called the United Front Work Department, and it’s raising as much alarm in the West as Beijing’s growing military arsenal.

Yang Tengbo, a prominent businessman who has been linked to Prince AndrewHe is the latest overseas Chinese citizen to be scrutinized – and sanctioned – for his ties to the UFWD.

The existence of the department is far from a secret. A decades-old and well-documented arm of the Chinese Communist Party has been embroiled in controversy before. Investigators from the United States to Australia have cited the UFWD in multiple espionage cases, often accusing Beijing of using it for foreign interference.

Beijing has denied all allegations of espionage, calling them ridiculous.

So what is the UFWD and what does it do?

The United Front – which originally referred to a broad communist alliance – was once hailed by Mao as the key to the Communist Party’s triumph in the decades-long Chinese Civil War.

After the war ended in 1949 and the party began governing China, the United Front’s activities took a backseat to other priorities. But in the last decade under Xi, the United Front has experienced a renaissance of sorts.

Xi’s version of the United Front is broadly consistent with previous incarnations: “building the broadest possible coalition with all social forces that are relevant,” according to Mareike Ohlberg, a senior researcher at the German Marshall Fund.

At first glance, the UFWD is not a shady organization: it even has a website and reports on many of its activities there. But the scope of his work – and its reach – is less clear.

While much of that work is domestic, Dr. Ohlberg said, “a key target that has been defined for the United Front’s work is the overseas Chinese.”

Today, the UFWD seeks to influence public debates on sensitive issues ranging from Taiwan – which China claims as its territory – to the repression of ethnic minorities in Tibet and Xinjiang.

It also attempts to shape narratives about China in foreign media, attack critics of the Chinese government abroad, and co-opt influential Chinese figures abroad.

“The work of the United Front may include espionage, but it is broader than espionage,” Audrye Wong, assistant professor of politics at the University of Southern California, tells the BBC.

“Beyond the act of acquiring covert information from a foreign government, the United Front’s activities focus on the broader mobilization of overseas Chinese,” he said, adding that China is “unique in the scale and scope” of such activities. of influence.

China has always had ambitions to exert that influence, but its rise in recent decades has given Beijing the ability to exert it.

Since Xi became president in 2012, he has been especially proactive in developing China’s message to the worldencouraging a confrontation “wolf warrior” approach to diplomacy and urging his country’s diaspora to “tell China’s story well.”

The UFWD operates through several overseas Chinese community organizations, which have vigorously defended the Communist Party beyond their shores. They have censored anti-CCP artwork and protested the activities of the Tibetan spiritual leader the Dalai Lama. The UFWD has also been linked to threats against members of persecuted minorities abroad, such as Tibetans and Uyghurs.

But much of the UFWD’s work overlaps with that of other party agencies, operating under what observers have described as “plausible deniability.”

It is this darkness that is causing so much suspicion and apprehension about the UFWD.

When Yang appealed against his ban, the judges agreed with the then-Secretary of State’s report that Yang “posed a national security risk,” citing the fact that he downplayed his ties to the UFWD as one of the reasons. led them to that conclusion.

Yang, however, maintains that he has done nothing illegal and that the spying accusations are “completely false.”

Cases like Yang’s are becoming more common. In 2022, British Chinese lawyer Christine Lee was accused by MI5 of acting through the UFWD to cultivate relationships with influential people in the United Kingdom. The following year, Liang Litang, an American citizen who ran a Chinese restaurant in Boston, was accused of providing information about Chinese dissidents in the area to his contacts in the UFWD.

And in September, Linda Sun, a former aide in the New York governor’s office, was accused of using her position to serve the interests of the Chinese government, receiving benefits including travel in return. According to Chinese state media reports, she had met with a senior UFWD official in 2017, who told her to “be an ambassador of Sino-American friendship.”

It is not uncommon for prominent and successful Chinese to be associated with the party, whose approval they often need, especially in the business world.

But where is the line between influence peddling and espionage?

“The line between influence and espionage is blurry” when it comes to Beijing’s operations, said Ho-fung Hung, a politics professor at Johns Hopkins University.

This ambiguity has intensified after China passed a law in 2017 requiring Chinese citizens and companies to cooperate with intelligence investigations, including sharing information with the Chinese government, a measure that Dr. Hung said would “effectively turns everyone into potential spies.”

The Ministry of State Security has released spectacular propaganda videos warning the public that there are foreign spies everywhere and that “they are cunning and cunning.”

Some students who were sent on special trips abroad were told by their universities to limit contact with foreigners and asked for a report of their activities upon their return.

And yet Xi is eager to promote China to the world. That is why he has tasked a reliable arm of the party with projecting strength abroad.

And that’s becoming a challenge for Western powers: How do they balance business with the world’s second-largest economy alongside serious security concerns?

Genuine fears about China’s influence abroad are contributing to more aggressive sentiments in the West, often leaving governments in a dilemma.

Some, like Australia, have tried to protect themselves with new laws from foreign interference. that penalize people considered to be involved in internal affairs. In 2020, the United States imposed visa restrictions on individuals considered active in UFWD activities.

An angry Beijing has warned that such laws – and the prosecutions they have spurred – hamper bilateral relations.

“The so-called accusations of Chinese espionage are absolutely absurd,” a Foreign Ministry spokesperson told reporters on Tuesday in response to a question about Yang. “The development of China-UK relations serves the common interests of both countries.”

Some experts say the long arm of China’s United Front is really worrying.

“Western governments must now be less naïve about the work of China’s United Front and take it as a serious threat not only to national security but also to the security and freedom of many ethnic Chinese citizens,” says Dr. Hung.

But, he adds, “governments must also be vigilant against anti-Chinese racism.” and work hard to build trust and cooperation with ethnic Chinese communities to counter the threat together.”

Last December, Di Sanh Duong, a Vietnamese-born ethnic Chinese community leader in Australia, was found guilty of plotting foreign interference for trying to approach an Australian minister. Prosecutors argued that he was an “ideal target” for the UFWD because he had run for office in the 1990s and boasted ties to Chinese officials.

Duong’s trial focused on what he meant when he said the minister’s inclusion in a charity event would be beneficial to “us Chinese”: was he referring to the Chinese community in Australia or mainland China?

In the end, Duong’s conviction (and prison sentence) raised serious concerns that such sweeping anti-espionage laws and prosecutions could easily become weapons to attack ethnic Chinese people.

“It is important to remember that not everyone who is ethnically Chinese supports the Chinese Communist Party. And not everyone who participates in these diaspora organizations is motivated by fervent loyalty to China,” says Dr. Wong.

“Overly aggressive policies based on racial profiling will only legitimize the Chinese government’s propaganda that ethnic Chinese are not welcome and will end up driving diaspora communities into the arms of Beijing.”