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He Israel Defense Forces (FDI) published most of their investigation of what happened on October 7, 2023, and in the days prior to the Hamas massacre. Although the initial investigation began in November 2023, the Chief of Staff of IDF outgoing, Lieutenant General Herzi Halevi, ordered all the units to initiate probes in March 2024. The IDF abstained offered to offer recommendations in their report, saying that those would be left in the Chief of FDI personnel, Major General (Res.) Eyal Zamir, who will enter next week.
The Israeli forces are seen among the debris of destroyed buildings after the clashes between Israeli and Palestinian forces in Be’eri, Israel on October 13, 2023. (Nir Keidar/Anadolu through Getty Images)
October 7 is not over. A year later, 101 hostages still stop in Gaza
1. October 7 in numbers
According to the evaluation of the IDF, 5,000-5,600 militants infiltrated Israel in three waves. Meanwhile, 4,696 rockets and mortars were shot at Israel. The attacks left 829 Israeli civilians, 76 foreign citizens and 415 dead security personnel. Besides, 251 hostages They were taken to Gaza’s strip.
“The fundamental failure was the result of the inability to understand the intentions and the preparation of Hamas for a large -scale surprise attack,” say the FDI officials in the report.
2. Hamas attack timeline
Hamas attacks were not hurried, according to IDF, planning began almost seven years before the massacre, with the formation of the “fundamental concept” in November 2016 and an “initial plan” in July 2017. The Hamas Plan was approved in July 2019 and the operational plan was established in August 2021. In the first 2022, a preparation committee was established and during the course of the terror evaluation.
The FDI says that Hamas considered numerous dates for attacks, including September 16, which was Rosh Hashaná, the Jewish New Year and September 25, Yom Kippur, the Jewish day of the atonement. Finally, on October 7, 2023, which coincided with the Jewish party of Simchat Torá, which marks the end and restart the Torah.
This image of the video provided by the first in South response shows carbonized and damaged cars along a desert road after an attack of Hamas terrorists at the Music Festival of the Nova Trance tribe, near Kibbutz Re’IM in southern Israel, on Saturday, October 7, 2023. (South First Responders through AP)
Looking back in the timeline of the Israel War against Hamas after October. 7
3. Complete line of October 7
The attack, according to the evaluation of the IDF, began to take shape in the early hours of October 7. Hamas supposedly began to prepare forces around 11:00 pm on October 6, after spending much of the day by placing them on alert and gathering weapons, and concluded the information sessions at 4:00 am on October 7.
The infiltration itself began with the first wave at 6:29 am, when 1,154 members of the Nukhba forces of Hamas invaded, breaking the security barrier between Gaza and Israel. The FDI declared an emergency state at 6:43 am, and the 7:10 am, the Israeli Air Force (IAF) did the same.
Between 7:00 am and 9:00 am, 3,400 militants were within the Israeli territory. In addition, just before 8:00 am, Hamas Mohammed Deif’s military commander asked civilians in Gaza to join the attacks. The evaluation establishes that after 9:00 am, the attackers took advantage of the FDI failures and took advantage of the opportunities to promote the assault. Some supposedly planned to deepen the Israeli territory.
Several of the “main attacks” were arrested by the IDF around 1:00 pm, but there were still hundreds of attackers in Israel at 3:00 pm, the FDI says it won the control of some of the communities and surrounding areas at 9:00 pm, but dozens were present around midnight.
“We did not predict that Hamas could be so brutal in their struggle,” they wrote senior FDI officials.
4. Incorrect evaluation of IDF threats
Much of the FDI approach was in Iran and Hezbollah before the attacks of October 7, and Hamas was defined as a secondary threat at that time. In addition, the FDI assumed that it could contain the activity of Hamas, since it worked to “gradually improve the existing reality” with the aim of eliminating the terrorist group.
The IDF also believed that “Hamas did not want a large -scale war”, which led Israel to conclude that a large -scale invasion was unlikely. In the evaluation, the IDF says that Hamas took advantage of Israel’s perception of the situation and used it for its advantage.
Another important erroneous concept in the evaluation is the thought of the IDF that the main threat of Hamas was the rockets and mortars who shot from Gaza. This combined with the dependence of defense tactics and a barrier, as well as the reduction of troops on the Israel-Gaza border would lead to a catastrophe.
5. Intelligence failures
The Intelligence Directorate of Israel did not understand or analyze completely Intel that he had in Hamas and his intentions. Apparently, this also applies to the perception of the FDI of the “Shiite” axis and its views on Israel. The FDI says that during the review he found deeply rooted systemic problems with the Directorate of Intelligence and Culture.
Since 2018, the Intelligence Directorate had been collecting information about the concept of Hamas for a large -scale attack against Israel. However, the plan was considered unfeasible and it was thought that it reflected the long -term objectives of Hamas.
In August 2021, Intel in Hamas military wing He described the plan for a large -scale attack against Israeli communities and military advanced positions surrounding the Gaza Strip. Intelligence officials failed to make the connection between this new Inl and what he had gathered in 2018.
The intelligence received in the months prior to October 7 indicated that Hamas was carrying out training exercises for raids. This apparently changed the evaluation of the situation of Unit 8200 of Israel, but supposedly this did not communicate with senior leadership.
Israeli soldiers inspect the burned cars of the festival attendees at the site of an attack on the Nova Festival by Hamas armed men from Gaza, near Israel’s border with the Gaza Strip, in southern Israel, on October 13, 2023. (Reuters/Amir Cohen)
The Israeli army finds bodies of 3 hostages in Gaza killed in October. 7 Music Festival
6. “Early Signs” Lost
In the afternoon of October 6, 2023, Sim Israeli cards were activated within Gaza. However, this was not alerted as it had happened before. Those same SIM cards would then allow Hamas militants to communicate after they crossed the border to Israel. There were also indications that Hamas leaders gathered. However, according to the evaluation of the IDF, none of these facts was enough to change the way of thinking of the intelligence direction in Gaza, therefore, there was no alert.
There were also indications of both habitual and unusual Hamas activity that night. The investigation revealed that there were sources of intelligence that could have been used during the night to improve the information that was not used. However, the IDF affirm that if the Intelligence Directive had changed its evaluation of the situation, there would have been a higher alert for a localized offensive of Hamas, but not for a total war.
7. IAF evaluation
It was discovered that the IAF had complied with and even exceeded the defined standards of preparation, except by two instances due to a strong rocket fire. However, these standards did not align with what would have been required to prepare for a large -scale surprise attack. The IDF concluded that there was a “significant difficulty” that distinguished the troops of the IDF, civilians and terrorists with each other.
While the IAF hit the key Hamas command centersThe IDF admits that even in its review of the strikes it is difficult to determine if there could be a more effective strike effort given the circumstances.
However, it was observed that the IDF did not prepare for anything like the brutal massacre of October 7.
“We were addicted to intelligence and precise information that we obtained as commanders and we did not consider other scenarios. This failure will be recorded forever in our memories, and we will never forget it and we should never forget,” wrote senior FDI officials.
A house destroyed after a battle between Israeli soldiers and Palestinian terrorists on October 10, 2023 in Kfar Aza, Israel. (Amir Levy/Getty images)
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In its conclusion, the FDI points out that the evaluation of the situation in Gaza and with respect to Hamas was so entrenched in the establishment that there was no deep discussion about the alternative possibilities. In addition, it now says that it was “incorrect” to try to “control Hamas in conflict” and, in the future, the elimination of threats should be prioritized.
The evaluation also addresses the possibility of a future attack, saying that a preventive strategy will be key.
