Internal messages hint at the key reason that Trump Doj left the case against New York Mayor Eric Adams,

Three weeks ago, the media were consumed by a storm of fire that exploded when President Donald Trump’s American lawyer for the Southern District of New York, Danielle Sassoon, resigned in protest for the ordered Finish the prosecution of the Mayor of New York, Eric Adams,.

The acceptance of Sassoon’s public and unworthy resignation was closely followed by the resignation of several of his subordinates in New York, as well as lawyers in the public integrity section of the Department of Justice in Washington, all of which opposed the dismissal of the case. The motion to say goodbye was finally Filed by the Interim Deputy Attorney General Emil Bove.

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The media extolled the “courage” of the career prosecutors who were facing the “corrupt” efforts of the newly installed Trump Doj officials to reward the mayor of the rebel democrat for their opposition to the immigration policies of the Biden administration. It was also alleged that the dismissal of the charges was a reward, or What is the place where? for its commitment after the election to cooperate with the efforts of the Trump administration to reverse the open border policies of former President Biden.

The Biden Department of Justice had accused Adams last September for a somewhat questionable bribery charge that involves an improved flight to Türkiye. Because it occurred after having expressed public criticism of Biden policies about illegal immigration, some Adams supporters considered another example of the “weapons” of the Department of Justice of Biden.

On March 3, the judge in the case pointed out during a hearing about the motion that because the two parties were aligned: the Department of Justice and ADAMS Both agreed to the property of the motion: there is no one to advocate for the position taken by the former unhappy prosecutors. Were your concerns and complaints valid and something that the judge should consider by deciding what to do with the motion? To address these concerns, the judge appointed a lawyer “amicus” to advise the court on the legitimacy of the problems raised by those who oppose the dismissal. His election, the former attorney general of the Department of Justice Paul Clement, reviewed the motion and, on Friday, presented a summary before the Court on the legal and objective affairs presented.

While Clement was presenting his brief attached attorney general Todd Blanche, along with his now attached attachment, Bove, presented a memorandum under his own signatures, other officials of the Department of Justice are not listed. The point of that was to make it very clear that this is the position of the Management of the Senior Doj, and the opinions of the subordinates in the chain of command are not relevant or necessary.

There are two interesting conclusions and different from the two memoranda. First, the Department of Justice is completely correct about the law and the almost complete discretion that falls to the Executive Power by making the decision to leave a case even after an accusation of a large jury is returned. Second, the Blanche memorando makes it clear that the arguments of “weapon” that were offered as the basis for dismissal are the object of an ongoing investigation into Adams investigation and the decision to accuse him. This second meal to carry is revealed by the fact that the memorandum appointments of some communications between the members of the SDNY Prosecutor’s Office. It also requests that the full text of these communications be placed under seal and does not appear in the public file. This request indicates that an ongoing investigation on the matter is underway.

As for the first conclusion, on whether Trump’s DOJ has the law on his side by moving to dismiss the case, Clement memorandum presents some tense arguments to suggest a role for the court when reviewing the motions to dismiss. But he knew when he began that there is simply a torrent of the jurisprudence that recognizes the discretion almost without control granted in the executive branch to make the pending motion, combined with the understanding that there is no significant way for a court to force the executive branch to process a case that is determined not to prosecute.

The Memorandum of the Department of Justice cites dozens of cases that underline that the final decision to decide to dismiss a case almost completely falls with the executive branch. The following are just a sample of the appointments of different cases, without the names of cases for the brevity, including by the DOJ in its memorandum.

• “The government can choose to avoid or discontinue prosecutions for any of a series of reasons,” including a “change” in the “Justice Department policy.”
• “(A) Blenent any evidence of bad faith, this court lacks the authority to guess the decision of the government that seeks dismissal, and instead must attribute the presumption of regularity to the government.”
• “The justification behind this general rule is that the Executive remains the absolute judge of whether a prosecution must be initiated and the first and allegedly the best judge of whether a pending prosecution must be canceled.”
• “(T) The ‘Court license’ in rule 48 (a) … does not confer any new power in the courts to analyze and counteract the exercise of the prosecution of its traditional authority on collection and application decisions.”
• “(I) t is not the function of the Judiciary to review the exercise of executive discretion, whether it is that of the same president or those whom he has delegated certain of his powers.”
• There is a “presumption of good faith by the government by seeking the dismissal of charges.” The presumption is operative “in the absence of clear evidence otherwise.”

Even so, the Clement memorandum tries to forge some space for the Court to evaluate the decision.

“… Rule 48 (a) provides the Court with an important, but limited role in the evaluation of the government’s motion to suspend a current prosecution,” he says. “The rule authorizes the court to consider how the Prosecutor’s Office should be suspended, with or without prejudice, instead of training the Court to take charge of the fiscal function of the same executive.”

Because Adams is an elected public official, Clement recommends that the dismissal be “with prejudice”, which means that it cannot be brought again in the future. This recommendation is not anchored to any specific legal authority or case appointment: Clement simply suggests that it is prudential to avoid the perception that Adams, although still mayor, could be influenced in its decision -making for the interest of avoiding the filling of the accusation.

Contrary to some comments from reports and social networks, Clement does not reach a conclusion on the question of whether the case began incorrectly, “armed”, or that the reasons for dismissing the case are characterized by bad faith or a quid Pro quo incorrect. What Clement says is that the fact that both accusations have been issued in public weigh in favor of dismissing the case, since either, independent of the other, it would be a basis to dismiss the accusation with prejudice.

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What these two notes underline more than anything is the fundamental misunderstanding of the law by the former prosecutors now present. The premise of his protest and his subsequent resignations was that they could not present an argument of “good faith” to the court under rule 48 (a) that would justify dismissing the accusation. They did not recognize that other application priorities of the new Trump administration could overcome their search for the mayor’s own justice as a scoundrel.

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But more significantly, they did not understand that each decision to process or is not compensation against the competitive interests that are at stake. By mistake, and naively, they believed that an initiated prosecution based on sufficient evidence should be taken until its conclusion, and that any decision to make otherwise based on competitive policy considerations must be “corrupt.”

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