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Clark tells WIRED that Russia’s systems were “not very mobile, not very distributed.” Their relatively few large systems, Clark says, “were not really combat relevant.”
Moscow’s strategy assumed a relatively static battlespace. Along the front they would deploy Infaunaheavy armored vehicle targeting radio communications. Farther out, about 15 miles from the front line, they were sending Learning-3A six-wheeled truck can not only jam mobile networks, but also interfere with communications and even send SMS to nearby mobile phones. Even farther away, about 180 miles away, the size of a fire truck Krasukha-4 it would break the antenna sensors.
“When you get close to the front, you get an electronic vibe,” says Clark. “Your GPS won’t work, your cell phone won’t work, Starlink won’t work.”
Clark explains that this electromagnetically free human territory is what happens when you “barrage.” But there’s a big trade-off, he says. Jamming across the spectrum requires more power, as does jamming over a wider geographic area. The more power the system has, the bigger it should be. So you can disrupt all communications in the targeted area or some communications further away, but not necessarily both.
At the beginning of the war, the Russian army was crippled by poor communication, worse planning, and a general slowness to adapt. It was still a big start. “Unfortunately, the enemy has both numerical and material advantage,” a representative of UP Innovations, a Ukrainian defense technology startup, told WIRED in a written statement.
Thus, Ukraine developed two complementary strategies: produce large volumes of cheaper EW solutions and make them repeatable and adaptable.
For example, Ukraine’s Bukovel-AD anti-drone system fits comfortably in the back of a pickup truck. The Ether the suitcase-sized system can detect jamming signals from Russian EW systems, allowing Ukraine to target them with artillery. Ukrainian electronic warfare company Kvertus now makes 15 different anti-drone systems, from backpacks that suppress drones to stationary devices that can be mounted on radio towers to intercept incoming UAVs.
When full-scale war broke out in 2022, Quertus had one product: a shoulder-mounted anti-drone weapon like the EDM4S. “In 2022 (we were producing) dozens of devices,” Kvertus CEO Yaroslav Filimonov told me when I sat down in his Kiev office in March this year. “In 2023, there were hundreds. Now? There are thousands.”